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Abstract: This article explores the rebuilding of the South Bronx from 1977 to 2003. This 
rebuilding represents an important public policy accomplishment, since the South Bronx was    
one of the most physically devastated areas in the United States. In terms of economic policy, the 
rebuilding of the South Bronx defies linear narratives. One the one hand, public-private 
partnerships, which represent some of the most important features of urban neoliberalism were 
used heavily in the revitalization of the South Bronx. Community organizations that had been 
rebuilding areas in the South Bronx in the 1970s and the 1980s were required to conform to the 
requirements of the market, if they were to continue participating in urban development. On the 
other hand, the building of housing for low- and moderate-income people is not exactly a 
neoliberal economic policy, since these housing units were built with public subsidies and 
regulated by government agencies. In its insistence to rebuild the South Bronx as well as other 
physically devastated areas, the city government of New York became involved in creative 
financing by incorporating non-government organizations that were ran by accomplished 
businesspeople but remained non-profit. And whatever the original intentions of city 
administrations in building and preserving affordable housing in the South Bronx may have been, 
the accommodation of so many low income people performing low-paying but essential jobs, has 
contributed to the making of a more vibrant urban economy, even if these same people are not 
necessarily the ones benefitting from New York’s economic dynamism. 
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 In 1973, New York Times journalist Martin Tolchin characterized the South Bronx as 
“Dresden after the war,” “a jungle stalked by fear, seized by rage,” “a foreign country where fear 
is the overriding emotion in a landscape of despair” and a place that is “violent, drugged, burned 
out, graffiti splattered and abandoned.”1 Throughout the decade, television crews, film makers, 
and journalists, from the United States and around the world, reinforced these depictions with 
visual representations of burned-out buildings, shabby streets, sidewalks with overgrown grass, 
empty lots filled with garbage, disemboweled fire hydrants, crime stories, and suffering 
residents.2 While many of these reports and images focused on the negative and the spectacular, 
the South Bronx was indeed a distressed urban area. Between 1970 and 1975 the South Bronx 
lost approximately 43,000 housing units. This housing loss continued unabated with about 7,000 
fires erupting in the South Bronx between 1975 and 1977. By 1977 there were more than 3,000 
lots and buildings that were considered vacant and covered more than 500 acres. There were also 
more than 6,900 residential parcels that owed taxes for at least one year and would eventually be 
subject to municipal takeover (Figure 1). In the 1970s the South Bronx lost 309,471 residents out 
of 772,589 (Figure 2).3    
 About forty years later, it is difficult to imagine such depictions and figures referring to 
the Bronx. What was known as the South Bronx has been rebuilt and no one questions the 
viability of its future. Empty lots and damaged housing are not common. The sound of sirens 
coming from fire trucks driving up and down major avenues is unusual. So are fires. The 
population of the South Bronx is growing rather than shrinking. The commercial districts, public 
parks, neighborhood sidewalks, and public squares of the South Bronx are vibrant while the 
crime rate is lower than that of many major cities in the United States.4 
 This article examines the rebuilding of the South Bronx from 1977 to 2013. This 
rebuilding included policies and actions by both the city and federal governments and involved 
the building or rehabilitation of housing and a liberalization of the flow of immigration after 
1965. To be sure these policies, which reinforced each other, were not exactly coordinated. Still, 
the rebuilding of the South Bronx is a major accomplishment of public policy, the kind that can 
function as an example to areas still afflicted by urban decline. At the same time, as many other 
major public policies, the rebuilding of the South Bronx had its advantages and disadvantages. 
On the one hand, the new housing did not eliminate homelessness, did not accommodate the 
poorest of the poor, and sometimes required tenant incomes that were higher than those 
prevailing in the South Bronx. Moreover, the affordable housing subsidies used were not 
permanent and their renewal required substantial amounts of money to be spent in the 2000s. On 
the other hand, thousands of housing units were rehabilitated and thousands more were newly 
built. The South Bronx became a magnet for working class people, mostly immigrants, who were 
accommodated by a rebuilt infrastructure and a growing housing market that was affordable. In 
turn these working class populations fueled the economic growth that New York City has been 
experiencing, even if they were usually not the prime beneficiaries of this growth. In other words, 
while this rebuilding policy had its limits, it provided some affordable housing to a working class 
population necessary for the viability of an urban economy. 
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Figure 1. Map of the South Bronx with blocks in substantial tax arrears as of September 1976. 
The dots represent entire blocks and not individual properties. Source: City of New York, 
Summary: The South Bronx: A Plan for Revitalization (New York: The City, 1977), 44. 
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Figure 2. Total population in the South Bronx, 1970-2010. Source: U.S. Census Bureau surveys, 
1970-2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An image of the Hub, a commercial district in the Melrose-Mott Haven areas of the 
Bronx. Source: Photo taken by the author in 2004. 
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Efforts to Rebuild the South Bronx, 1977-1985 
 In February of 1976, Roger Starr, administrator of Housing and Development, called for 
the systematic withdrawal of the city government from areas such as the South Bronx and 
Brownsville suffering from extreme population decline and a reduction in their housing stock. 
He called his strategy planned shrinkage and urged the mass resettlement of the remaining 
residents of these areas to other neighborhoods. Starr justified his recommendation by saying that 
planned shrinkage would make the fiscal crisis less painful to middle class New Yorkers, 
allowing the city government to concentrate in neighborhoods that had a viable future.5 
 Starr was influenced by trends, which showed that the South Bronx was rapidly declining. 
Indeed in the 1970s the South Bronx lost 36 percent of its housing stock (Figure 4) and 40 
percent of its population (Figure 2). This meant that one in three housing units was damaged or 
abandoned. Overall more than 90,000 housing units were no longer officially occupied. Vacant 
buildings, deserted blocks, shabby streets, and large swaths of empty land dominated the 
landscape of the South Bronx. This decline began before the fiscal crisis, though the trend of 
housing and population loss continued into the 1980s.6 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Occupied housing units in the South Bronx, 1970-2010. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
surveys, 1970-2010. 
 
  The fiscal crisis was precipitated in 1975 when financial institutions refused to buy short-
term New York City bonds, leaving the city short of cash to cover its expenses. New York 
avoided filing for bankruptcy after the federal and state governments agreed to provide loans and 
other assistance while the state began to oversee city finances, threatening to intervene if 
unorthodox financial practices reemerged. In order to deal with the financial crisis, the city 
government laid off public employees, reduced the provision of municipal services, and 
abandoned many of its capital projects such as the building of new housing. City budgets stopped 
growing during the Abraham D. Beame administration (1974-1977) and even declined between 
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1978 and 1981 under Mayor Edward I. Koch (1978-1989) (Figure 5).7 
 
 
  
Figure 5. City of New York budgets by administration, 1966-2013. Using GDP deflator these 
figures are adjusted to 2013 constant dollars. In 1966, the first year of Mayor John V. Lindsay, 
the annual budget was a bit more than $20 billion (almost $3.8 billion in nominal dollars). In 
2013, the final year of Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, the budget surpassed the $70 billion mark. 
Generally, as the economy grew so did the budget. Source: Annual Report of the Comptroller of 
the City of New York, 1966-1979 and the Independent Budget Office of the City of New York, 
Agency Expenditures, 1980-2014 (New York: The Office, 2015). 
 
 While numerous public officials including Mayor Beame denounced Starr’s planned 
shrinkage suggestion as inhumane and impractical, these ideas of abandoning the South Bronx 
were not unusual; they represented the dividing line between two conflicting visions of New 
York’s future. In the 1970s, the population of New York City declined for the first time in its 
history. The city lost 823,212 people amounting to 10.4% of its population (Figure 6). Some 
members of city’s elite wanted to hasten this contraction, so that the city government could 
allocate its limited resources in viable areas. Felix G. Rohatyn — a banker who was heading the 
Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC), which during the fiscal crisis was authorized by the 
state to sell bonds to meet the borrowing costs of the city — sided with Starr and argued that 
blighted areas of New York should be bulldozed and rebuilt as industrial areas. In 1978, U.S. 
Senator from New York Daniel Patrick Moynihan opposed the reconstruction of parts of the 
South Bronx with federal funds stating: “People in the South Bronx don’t want housing or they 
wouldn’t burn it down. It’s fairly clear that housing is not the problem in the South Bronx.”8 
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Moynihan subscribed to the idea that residents of areas like the South Bronx while pursuing their 
own selfish interests were responsible for false fire alarms, arson, and other forms of housing 
destruction. Though not shared by Koch, these conclusions made large-scale plans to rebuild the 
South Bronx more difficult to justify.9 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Population in New York City, 1940-2010. Source: U.S. Census Bureau surveys, 1970-
2010. 
 
 The only large-scale housing project to be completed during this period involved the 
Morrisania Air Rights Houses. This project was planned in the early 1970s when the city 
government secured funding from the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) 
for its construction. However, it was not possible to find a developer willing to build the project 
for the amount appropriated. This changed in 1977 by which time construction costs had dropped 
because of the economic slowdown. It was constructed in the 1977-1980 period. Morrisania Air 
Rights was built on a platform on top of the Penn Central railroad. It comprised of three 
buildings that covered the length of five blocks between East 158th and East 163rd Streets west 
of Park Avenue and contained 843 low-income housing units.10 
 The Morrisania Air Rights project showed a new determination by city officials to 
revitalize the South Bronx. In the spring of 1977, Bronx Borough president Robert Abrams and 
chairman of the City Planning Commission Victor Marrero prepared a redevelopment proposal 
and sent it to the secretary of HUD Patricia Harris. While the proposal and the discussions that 
followed went nowhere, President Jimmy Carter and Harris visited the South Bronx that 
October. Carter requested a new rebuilding plan. Recycling older proposals, the Beame 
administration sent a plan in the end of 1977. It included a five-year $870 million rebuilding, 
employment, and commercial development plan with the federal government paying something 
between $658 and $738 million. Given that Beame had been defeated in his reelection bid that 
September, it would be up to the incoming Mayor Koch to implement this rebuilding.11 
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 In the first three months of 1978, the Koch administration made its own South Bronx 
revitalization plan that would cost more than $1 billion (revised later to $1.5 billion). Koch 
appointed Lloyd M. Kaplan as the project’s coordinator. However, Herman Badillo one of 
Koch’s deputy mayors took charge of the project. Badillo who had served as housing 
commissioner (1962-1965), Bronx Borough president (1966-1969), and congressman (1971-
1977), resigned his U.S. House of Representatives position in order to become deputy mayor. He 
met with Carter and argued that the rebuilding of devastated low income neighborhoods across 
the United States required the construction of low-density housing for homeowners. Given that 
high density housing occupied by renters was viewed as a cause of the South Bronx’s decline, 
this proposal sought to address the problem by completely remaking the built environment and 
tenancy of the area. Anticipating that most of the people willing to live in the South Bronx could 
not afford to pay mortgages and large down payments, Badillo recommended state subsidies. He 
insisted that the South Bronx only needed new housing and tenants, since it already had the 
water systems, sewers, subway stations, schools, and other infrastructure necessary for 
neighborhoods to function. The federal government pledged a $56.5 million first installment in 
April of 1978, though most of the money was earmarked for economic development. The city 
insisted in its housing plan and Badillo recruited Edward J. Logue to be the executive director of 
the South Bronx Development Organization (SBDO). Logue had previously been in charge of 
urban renewal in New Haven (1954-1960) and Boston (1961-1967). He went on to head New 
York’s Urban Development Corporation (UDC) between 1968 and 1975. Although the UDC, a 
public benefit corporation that could issue moral obligation bonds, almost defaulted in its debt in 
1975 and was bailed out by the state, thousands of housing units were built in various parts of the 
state including the city under Logue’s leadership. Logue was viewed as someone with the ability 
to develop housing for low-, moderate-, and middle-income families that could be self-
sustainable. The SBDO was also involved in economic development by attracting industry to 
abandoned industrial areas.12 
 Badillo’s rebuilding plans failed. He selected the area around Charlotte Street, which had 
been toured by Carter, as the first redevelopment site and proposed the building of a 732-unit, 
low-rise cooperative with a cost of $32 million. Robert F. Wagner Jr. who had become chair of 
the City Planning Commission declared his opposition to the project, arguing that it would be 
isolated from sound neighborhoods. Wagner favored the expansion of viable neighborhoods 
rather than building in the middle of nowhere. He came around to support the project only after 
pressure by Koch who promised to also rebuild the area around Charlotte Street, so that a 
continuous neighborhood could be formed. The members of the Board of Estimate expressed 
their reservations as well, but ended up approving the project by a vote of 10-1 in November of 
1978. However, the project remained controversial. In February of 1979, the Board of Estimate 
met again for what appeared to be a procedural vote over the closure of some streets in order to 
create a superblock in the Charlotte Street development area. In this meeting, the Board of 
Estimate voted against the street modification by 7-4 and effectively killed the project. The 
members of the Board of Estimate turned around for various reasons including political ones. 
However, they also worried that the Koch administration was placing too much emphasis on the 
South Bronx at the expense of other devastated areas in their boroughs. Portions of Brooklyn and 
Queens were experiencing their own severe urban decline problems that were worsening because 
of the city’s reduction in the funding of municipal services, infrastructural maintenance, and 
capital projects.13 
 This vote was the catalyst of a number of developments that defined the rebuilding of the 
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South Bronx until 1985. Koch angrily denounced the opponents of Charlotte Street development 
and cancelled the entire seven-year $1.5 billion South Bronx rebuilding plan. Badillo removed 
himself from the South Bronx effort and resigned as deputy mayor a few months later. In August 
of 1979, the Koch administration announced a new $375 million rebuilding plan, which was 
characterized by Badillo as “the most cowardly kind of retreat a Mayor could indulge in.”14 The 
editors of the New York Times praised the new plans for the South Bronx, which were drafted 
with Logue’s input: “Mr. Logue also urges plans that would consolidate rather than expand the 
borough’s population and economic activity; it would be futile to rebuild for a population as 
large as that of the 1940’s.”15 Logue understood that even the commitment of $375 million by 
the city was questionable and curtailed his plans. After all, his office had been operating with $4 
million each year since 1978. The appropriation of an amount higher than this for the following 
twelve months appeared unlikely. To be sure, there were other funds by other agencies that were 
earmarked for the South Bronx, even if those were also meager.16  
 Logue decided to abandon top-down development that characterized Badillo’s approach 
and pursue projects with a number of community development corporations (CDCs). CDCs 
emerged in the late 1960s after an amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 
encouraged the collaboration of the private sector with the government and communities in order 
to tackle the problems of urban poverty. It was during this period that Father Louis Gigante’s 
South East Bronx Community Organization (SEBCO) operating mostly in Hunts Point was 
established, so that it could participate in the Model Cities program. The emphasis of these early 
CDCs was economic development with housing being only one aspect of their activities. The 
restructuring of federal housing policy under Richard Nixon shifted the CDCs’ focus to housing. 
In 1974, the Community Services Act formally recognized CDCs and provided them with 
Community Development Block Grants primarily used for capital investments. In 1978, the 
Community Reinvestment Act made it easier for low income communities to access capital from 
financial lenders and this further encouraged housing development by CDCs. Between 1977 and 
1981, SEBCO in partnership with developer Jerome Chatsky developed twenty-six buildings 
comprising of 1,070 housing units. Other CDCs in the South Bronx included the Bronx Frontier 
Development Corporation, Banana Kelly, and the People’s Development Corporation. They did 
not have as many projects as SEBCO, but they were determined to make a difference in the 
blocks that they covered. These organizations operated in their own neighborhoods, used sweat 
equity, and received subsidies from the city, state, and federal governments. They collaborated 
with private developers and aimed at the rehabilitation (and sometimes new building) of well-
managed, self-sustainable, and adequately-maintained buildings. CDCs took the lead in 
developing the South Bronx during this period sometimes cooperating with Logue and the city 
government and sometimes pursuing their own projects in partnership with the federal 
government. However, after a substantial influx of federal money in 1980 when Carter was 
running for reelection, funding declined.17 
 Lacking the funds to substantially rebuild the South Bronx, in the early 1980s the city 
government in alliance with foundations and CDCs resorted to image-making, so that the area 
would at least appear attractive. The Bronx Land Reclamation Project, the first far-reaching 
effort to regenerate the image of the South Bronx, was led by the Open Space Task Force and 
Logue’s SBDO. Organizations such as the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, the J. M. Kaplan 
Fund, the Ford Foundation, and the Fund for the City of New York offered grants to CDCs such 
as Banana Kelly, the Bronx Frontier Development Corporation, and the People’s Development 
Corporation to create community gardens, urban farms, and green playgrounds. In terms of land 
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coverage, the most extensive portion of the program included the planting of wildflowers in 
hundreds of acres of desolate neighborhoods. The CDCs and their funders viewed land 
reclamation as a temporary measure. They thought that the community gardens, urban farms, and 
flower gardens would eventually give way to redevelopment. The second important image-
making effort involved color vinyl decals that covered bricked up windows with pictures of 
curtains, shutters, flowerpots, and venetian blinds (Figure 7). Though a citywide program, the 
beautification of buildings visible from the Cross-Bronx Expressway received much publicity by 
city agencies. Robert Jacobson, director of the Bronx office of the City Planning Commission, 
argued that “the image that the Bronx projects — and projects to potential investors — is the 
image you see from that expressway, and our goal is to soften that image so people will be 
willing to invest.”18 The window-dressing project was ridiculed by the mass media, and Koch 
found himself writing a letter to the New York Times defending the project:  
We are simply trying to face the reality that New York cannot rehabilitate structurally sound 
buildings or demolish structurally unsound buildings as fast as we would like. We want to 
use decals as a way to make buildings waiting for either demolition or rehabilitation more 
attractive to communities and less attractive to vandals in the interim.19 
 
For Koch, image-making did not signify the further abandonment of the South Bronx by the city 
government, but an effort to improve its appearance until more money became available, though 
few shared his optimism that he would be able to find the funding to fix a broken borough.20 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Building in the South Bronx with vinyl decals. Source: Photo taken by the author in 
1997. 
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 Logue was interested in building housing more than in image-making projects and 
decided that he could activate the revival of the South Bronx by developing and marketing 
single-family suburban type houses with white picket fences. The SBDO had already been 
pursuing low-rise, home-ownership projects in a few select areas, subscribing to the idea that the 
South Bronx had too many rental properties and that this contributed to its dramatic decline. 
Logue made his priority land coverage rather than housing density, though the existing 
developments were not getting much publicity. He felt that the controversial Charlotte Street area 
that had been visited by various politicians and television crews, promised to change this, 
especially if the kind of housing built there resembled the suburban housing of Long Island and 
Westchester County. Logue proposed to buy houses manufactured elsewhere and ship them to 
the South Bronx; SBDO received about $300,000 from the Local Initiatives Support Corporation 
(LISC) — a philanthropic organization founded by the Ford Foundation — to build a couple of 
houses as models. Logue also approached the Mid-Bronx Desperadoes Housing Corporation 
(MBD) to become partners of the project. The MBD was formed in the mid-1970s by a number 
of churches, tenants’ associations, and other civic organizations. Father Gigante advised the 
group at various stages. The MBD used Gigante’s developer Chatsky to rehabilitate Vyse 
Avenue between East 173nd and 174th Streets. After Vyse Avenue, Logue partnered with the 
MBD because Charlotte Street was their territory. With the advice of the MBD, Logue hired 
members of the Nighthawks gang to guard the Charlotte Street development area, so that the 
housing models would not be vandalized. Eventually, about ninety ranch houses were built in the 
area. The project received much publicity, even when only two housing models occupied the 
site. However, this project led to Logue’s demise as developer.21   
 Logue had been a great builder but not a great administrator. When funding was plentiful 
as in most of his previous jobs, Logue could complete even the most difficult projects without 
minding the costs. He usually focused on the big picture, allowing others in his organization to 
deal with finance, management, and day-to-day operations. Lack of money in the South Bronx 
forced Logue to become more of a manager and to operate in a complicated environment of 
various actors pursuing their own interests. In Charlotte Gardens, Logue hired an inefficient 
contractor who caused long delays. Logue replaced the contractor, but this resulted to cost 
overruns. Making the houses elsewhere and shipping them to the Bronx was not as cheap as 
Logue originally thought contributing to even higher costs. In the end, it took three builders to 
finish the Charlotte Gardens houses. When it appeared that the government might cancel the 
remainder of the program, Logue ordered the construction of the concrete foundations for eighty 
houses, which cracked because of the cold winter temperatures. And such problems were not 
exclusive to Charlotte Gardens. SBDO was in charge of another project on East 169th Street in 
Morrisania. Eighty-three families put money down in 1982 to buy rowhouses. However, more 
than two years later, no houses were built other than the original two models while the developer 
had spent all the appropriated money and Chemical Bank was auditing the project before 
deciding to lend more. Logue found this to be unusual and said that “somebody owes somebody 
$3 million, and there are 81 homeowners hanging by their thumbs.”22 In the spring of 1984, the 
federal government refused to automatically renew SBDO’s funding as in previous years. Logue 
resigned from his post a few months later and the MBD took over the Charlotte Gardens 
project.23 
 In his efforts to jumpstart urban development in the South Bronx, Logue embraced 
suburban-style homeownership in an area that had traditionally been renter-occupied and high 
density. Logue claimed that he got the idea of building single-family homes in Charlotte Gardens 
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after observing the admirable behavior of homeowners who in the midst of deplorable conditions 
in the South Bronx took care of their houses and their neighborhoods.24  
 As Benjamin Holzman has demonstrated in his piece in this section, the supposed 
superiority of owners over renters as caretakers of property was an article of faith among many 
politicians and realtors. In the South Bronx, Logue’s claim was curious given that 95.7 percent of 
housing in 1980 was occupied by renters.25 If anything, they deserved credit for holding 
neighborhoods together. However, the assumption that homeowners functioned as anchors that 
stabilized neighborhoods persisted, even when it became obvious that this was not realistic in the 
South Bronx. This assumption is part of homeownership ideology in the United States under 
which homeowners are viewed as better citizens taking care of their community.26 
 Regardless, Logue’s approach had been admirable, though in the aggregate the South 
Bronx continued to lose housing units in the first half of the 1980s. Anyone of his stature would 
have resigned in 1979 when it became clear that the grand-scale plans to rebuild the South Bronx 
were discontinued. But Logue was optimistic; he felt that he could make a difference and that 
eventually his office’s successes would convince government agencies to rebuild the South 
Bronx. In fact, Koch and his close aides began to think of a more ambitious housing plan that 
would require large capital expenditures partly because Logue had shown that the possibility of 
revival existed and partly because low income areas in the city continued to lose housing units 
and this was interfering both with economic growth and the image of the city. 
 
The Rebuilding of the South Bronx, 1986-2001 
 In his 1985 state of the city, Mayor Koch announced that the city government would 
become more directly involved in the rebuilding of neighborhoods and spend $4.4 billion in 
order to build of rehabilitate 100,000 housing units in five years. A few months later, the 
administration amended the plan into a ten-year undertaking that would produce 250,000 
housing units. In 1989, the plan was amended once more committing $5.1 billion and promising 
the rehabilitation of rebuilding of a total of 252,000 housing units by 1996. These amendments 
of the original plan showed the extent to which administration officials were serious about the 
rebuilding of low income neighborhoods in New York City, given that there is no such thing as a 
grand-scale urban development plan that is not changed and revised several times. In the end, the 
completion of this neighborhood rebuilding required the commitment of three administrations. 
David N. Dinkins defeated Koch in the mayoral election of 1989 and Rudolph Giuliani defeated 
Dinkins in 1993.27 
 The timing for such an ambitious housing plan was right. After 1981, tax revenues and 
other income for the city increased while debt service expenditures declined. In the 1982-1984 
period budgets stabilized after four years of subsequent and painful declines. Then they began to 
grow substantially with a 7.1 percent growth in 1985 and another 4.4 percent in 1986 (Figure 5). 
Moreover, after a successful reorganization of the Fire Department structural fires which had 
been the cause of much housing destruction declined, reaching a level not seen since the early 
1960s (Figure 8). At the same time, affordable housing was becoming more difficult to obtain 
while thousands of buildings remained damaged. The Koch administration viewed this 
rebuilding as an economic development project that would improve the image of the city, rebuild 
neighborhoods, provide affordable housing, and solidify the mayor’s reelection chances in 1989 
for an unprecedented fourth term.28   
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Figure 8. Structural fires in New York City, 1959-2013. While these are citywide figures, the 
great majority of structural fires erupted in low income areas such as the South Bronx, 
devastating their built environment. Structural fires involve fires in buildings. They do not 
include brush fires, automobile fires, transit system fires, or garbage fires. Source: Fire 
Department Annual Reports and other documents of the City of New York, 1959-2013. 
 
 Despite the city’s growing economy, the Koch administration wanted to rely on public 
authorities for the financing of large infrastructural projects including housing, so that the city 
government would not be burdened with additional debt. This plan did not work out as 
anticipated. In 1984, the State of New York created the New York City Municipal Water Finance 
Authority (MWFA), a public benefit corporation, to finance the capital needs of the water and 
sewer system of the city. This action freed up hundreds of millions of dollars in the borrowing 
capacity of the city. Koch lobbied for the creation of more such corporations to repair bridges 
and build garbage disposal facilities, but the state legislature did not acquiesce. At the same time, 
city officials expected another public benefit corporation, the New York City Housing 
Development Corporation (HDC) to market tax-free bonds to finance most of the new housing 
after an increase in the corporation’s borrowing capacity; however, this did not happen at the 
levels expected. The HDC was founded in 1971 by the state legislature after the City of New 
York exhausted its constitutional capacity to incur additional debts for housing and urban 
development. The HDC was viewed as a way to get around this constitutional limitation by 
selling bonds to private investors without the city being directly responsible for them. Indeed, the 
HDC sold moral obligation bonds and used the proceeds to make loans to owners of multiple 
dwellings or to housing companies for the rehabilitation or new construction of rental housing 
for low-, moderate-, and middle-income people. The federal Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated 
many tax incentives for the production of rental housing and this undermined the Koch 
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administration’s expectation that the HDC would finance large portions of its housing plan. More 
than this, a severe economic slowdown in New York City, national economic problems, and the 
savings and loan crisis, made it more difficult for moral obligation bonds to be issued. As such 
the HDC’s bond issuance declined after 1985 for three subsequent years reaching the low figure 
of $11,430,000 (19,661,523 in 2013 dollars) in 1988. Despite some recovery, the levels of bond 
issuance remained low at a time that the city was pursuing its ambitious housing plan and 
reached the figure of $0 in 1992 (Figure 9). The city’s capital and operational budgets had to 
pick up the difference in order for the housing plan to continue at the scale originally envisioned. 
The existence of the MWFA allowed these increased expenditures.29   
 
 
 
Figure 9. HPD operational and capital expenditures as well as HDC proceeds from the sales of 
bonds, 1979-2013 in millions of dollars. Using GDP deflator these figures are adjusted to 2013 
constant dollars. Source: Annual Report of the Comptroller of the City of New York, 1979, the 
Independent Budget Office of the City of New York, 1980-2013, and the Annual Report of the 
HDC, 1979-2013. 
 
 The Ten-Year Housing Plan was implemented by the Department of Housing 
Preservation and Development (HPD). The HPD is a city agency in charge of developing and 
maintaining affordable housing.30 At the time, the agency’s operating expenses covered the 
management of in rem properties (tax-foreclosed buildings taken over by the city), the 
improvement and maintenance of existing housing, tenant assistance, demolition or seal up of 
damaged buildings, as well as administrative expenses and personnel salaries. The HPD’s capital 
budget, which was financed through the sale of bonds, covered mostly the gut rehabilitation of 
existing structures and the building of new ones. The HDC, viewed as a sister organization, was 
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closely collaborating with the HPD, providing funds that were entirely raised from non-city 
sources. However, the Ten-Year plan was mostly financed by HPD’s capital budget. Some 
money also came from the HPD’s operating budget. The plan also used federal funds, state funds, 
cross-subsidies from luxury projects, a contribution from the World Trade Center, and money 
from the Battery Park City Authority. Whether it was operating or capital funds, the HPD also 
paid for some of the infrastructural needs of the rebuilt areas and this included the repair of water, 
power, and sewage systems as well as street paving and sidewalk reconstruction.31 
 In 1986, the federal government created the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), 
which became the largest subsidy instrument for the production of affordable housing, after the 
elimination of project-based Section 8 housing. Through a bidding process, housing developers 
applied to local housing finance agencies for these tax credits to develop qualified properties. 
Developers who were awarded tax credits sold them to investors to raise capital for their projects. 
Investors received a dollar-for-dollar credit toward their federal tax liability for ten years. This 
system provided capital for the construction or rehabilitation of buildings, but not for their 
operation, meaning that rents were too expensive for low income people.32 
 The City of New York heavily relied on the LIHTC in its Ten-Year Housing Plan, though 
the HPD and the HDC used additional programs to make the housing more affordable and to 
prolong the affordable status of the developments. Besides providing the land and the buildings 
to be rehabilitated, the HPD used federal Section 8 vouchers that subsidized the rents of low 
income people. Additional subsidies that included the financing, operation, and capital 
improvements of some buildings extended the early generation of LIHTCs (1986-1990), which 
expired after fifteen years. In 1990, U.S. Congress added a second fifteen year affordability 
period for new LIHTCs.33   
 This system completed a policy shift from community development to institutionalized 
public-private partnerships. Public-private partnerships relied on powerful nonprofit umbrella 
intermediaries that managed housing programs by facilitating complicated relationships among 
government agencies, foundations, CDCs, community organizations, faith-based organizations, 
private owners, developers, builders, financial institutions, insurance companies, and investors, 
in contrast to CDCs often funded by HUD. The HPD worked in partnership with these nonprofit 
intermediaries whose staff became familiar with the landscape of low income neighborhoods, 
responsible landlords and developers, and fundraising techniques. Nonprofit intermediaries acted 
as regulators safeguarding the interests of investors by requiring CDCs to conform to paperwork 
and accounting standards, so that irregularities could be avoided. They also became involved in 
the LIHTC scheme by keeping track of the operation of low income developments and making 
sure that they complied with federal expectations, so that the tax benefits of investors would 
continue. Developers tried to meet the requirements of these nonprofit intermediaries, because 
they wanted to continue receiving LIHTCs and other public and private funding for new 
developments. While this independent safeguarding saved public money, intermediaries 
maintained stronger connections with landlords rather than tenants.34 
 The South Bronx became a major location for low income housing development during 
the Ten-Year Housing Plan with many nonprofit intermediaries operating there. One such 
nonprofit intermediary was the Community Preservation Corporation (CPC). Founded by David 
Rockefeller, CEO of Chase Manhattan Bank, in 1974 the CPC convinced major banks in New 
York to assist owners repair their apartment buildings located in working class neighborhoods. In 
the 1980s the CPC intensified its activities and during the Ten-Year Housing Plan it collaborated 
with the HPD in the Vacant Buildings Program. Local landlords with good records were selected 
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to bid for vacant properties, rehabilitate them, and become their owners. The CPC became the 
organization that streamlined a complicated process and provided these owners with technical 
support, loans, mortgages, government funds, and tax credits. The LISC did something similar. It 
selected a few reliable CDCs, helped them acquire vacant city properties for one dollar each, and 
marketed financial packages of LIHTCs for all the CDCs in concert to raise money for 
construction. The city government covered the rest of the costs and offered low interest 
mortgages to buyers. The Enterprise Foundation (EF) was another intermediary that used a 
number of nonprofit organizations to develop areas under the state’s Housing Trust Fund 
program.35  
 While the nonprofit intermediaries usually maintained good relations with the city 
government, faith-based organizations that were affiliated with the Industrial Areas Foundation 
(IAF) did not during the Koch administration. Such organizations under the name of East 
Brooklyn Churches had been successful in building and rehabilitating thousands of homes in 
Brooklyn under the Nehemiah program, which received assistance by the Koch administration in 
the early 1980s. When the Ten-Year Housing Plan was launched, faith-based organizations of 
the South Bronx that were affiliated with the IAF tried to bring Nehemiah to their borough. The 
city government refused to offer the group a contract to rehabilitate Site 404 and presented 
alternative development locations. The South Bronx churches rejected this offer as inadequate 
and declared war against the Koch administration.36  
 The Nehemiah case in the South Bronx showed the extent to which not all organized 
interests were accommodated under this housing plan by the Koch administration. Powerful 
intermediaries enjoying the financial support of wealthy sponsors and institutions did well. 
Grassroots organizations that had previously been involved in community development were 
frequently avoided by the government unless they linked with a nonprofit intermediary, partly 
because the city administration, was embroiled in a number of scandals and wanted to make sure 
that the housing program remained clean, while at the same time reducing bureaucratic 
safeguards that slowed housing construction. The New York City Housing Partnership (NYCHP), 
a nonprofit intermediary whose president and CEO Kathryn S. Wilde was closely allied to 
Rockefeller. Wilde had heavily criticized the city government for bureaucratic hurdles to actually 
constructing housing. Despite these criticisms, the city administration selected the NYCHP after 
the winner of the bid to develop Site 404 withdrew, partly to avoid dealing with IAF and the 
South Bronx churches, and partly because of hopes that Wilde’s organization would speedily 
increase the number of completed units.37 
 The Ten-Year Housing Plan was conceived by the Koch administration at a time of 
extreme criticism over its handling of the homeless crisis of New York City. In the 1980s, the 
number of homeless people visible in public space increased substantially, despite the city’s 
extensive construction of homeless shelters after emergency court orders. Homeless advocates 
argued that gentrification contributed to the displacement of low income residents from their 
homes and that the city government did not do enough to prevent the conversion of Single Room 
Occupancies (SROs) and other inexpensive dwellings into luxury housing. More than this, the 
budgetary austerity that Koch pursued between 1978 and 1984 added to the social and economic 
problems of thousands of low income New Yorkers while housing in working class 
neighborhoods was being destroyed. As president of the Borough of Manhattan, Dinkins 
emerged as one of Koch’s fiercest critics, especially on issues concerning housing and 
homelessness. Dinkins criticized Koch’s housing plan for excluding the poorest New Yorkers 
and the homeless. He asked James R. Dumpson, an expert on poverty who had held high posts in 
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all city administrations since 1959, to chair a task force on the homeless. In a report released by 
Dinkins’s office, the task force called for a substantial increase in housing allocated to the 
homeless and for a restructuring of the welfare shelter allowance. In fact, Dinkins wanted to 
make the new housing truly affordable and to have social service agencies rather than private 
owners operate it. Koch administration officials brushed aside these criticisms and claimed that 
Dinkins’s housing proposals were tremendously expensive; Koch always viewed his housing 
plan as an economic development mechanism and dismissed government-operated housing as a 
welfare program. Although some of the housing built went to homeless families, throughout his 
tenure Koch attacked the homeless as being unworthy, refusing to work, and taking advantage of 
valuable city resources.38 
 In 1989, Dinkins constructed an electoral coalition that he called a “Gorgeous Mosaic” 
consisting of blacks, Latinos, and liberal whites and defeated Koch in the Democratic primary; 
Dinkins went on to prevail in the general election against Giuliani and become New York’s first 
African American mayor. Koch’s dream of being elected for a fourth term was not realized 
because in the late 1980s the city’s economy faltered, racial antagonism persisted, and crime 
increased. Koch’s continuous verbal attacks against African Americans convinced many New 
Yorkers that he could not unite the city. In the mayoral campaign, Dinkins spoke of racial 
rapprochement and rejected Koch’s divisive rhetoric. Dinkins also criticized Koch’s half-hearted 
homeless policy, his neglect of low income populations, and the city administration’s tax 
giveaways to corporations and real estate developers.39 
 As mayor, Dinkins enlarged the Ten-Year Housing Plan and modified it. Despite an 
erosion of the city’s finances and the inability of the HDC to market bonds at optimal levels, the 
Dinkins administration spent more than double in HPD capital funds than the Koch 
administration. This amounted to an average of $895,058,756 (adjusted to 2013 dollars) spent 
per year in 1990-93 as opposed to $359,300,121 per year in 1987-89 (Figure 9). To be sure, 
capital expenses could have increased had Koch remained mayor and the 1990 budget was 
initially appropriated by his administration, though Dinkins maintained it and even enhanced it. 
Moreover, the HDC sold $354,010,956 in bonds (adjusted to 2013 dollars) per year in 1987-89 
as opposed to $246,543,816 per year in 1990-93. Still, Dinkins was quite committed to the 
success of this housing plan and spent more. Dinkins also modified the housing plan by making 
thousands of units more affordable, by setting aside more of the housing for homeless people, 
and by directly involving more CDCs.40  
 The city administration’s actions were influenced by arguments that approximately two-
thirds of the housing units constructed under Koch were market-rate and allocated to middle and 
upper middle class people. While such reports overstated the situation, the Koch administration 
did not provide as many subsidies for the operation of housing, meaning that many low income 
people could not afford it. The Dinkins administration modified this and changed the character of 
the housing plan. By 1998, low income households occupied two-thirds of the government 
constructed or rehabilitated housing units. Moderate income households occupied a quarter while 
the middle class lived in less than 10 percent of this housing. But the Dinkins administration 
encountered many problems. Housing production and rehabilitation during the Koch years was 
easier because large parcels of abandoned land could be redeveloped and developers took 
advantage of economies of scale. From 1990 onward, mostly smaller, more scattered sites 
remained available for development, which increased costs. Moreover, the public-private 
partnership structure that rose in the 1980s persisted and community input remained limited. 
Many of the CDCs, which used to be grassroots organizations were no longer representatives of 
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local resident interests, but had evolved into organizations characterized by market-type 
relationships. As the city’s economy deteriorated even more, Dinkins was forced to cut the 
capital budget for housing. While capital expenditures for housing increased by 50.5 percent in 
1990 and another 16.5 percent in 1991, they declined by 9.3 percent in 1992 and another 34.1 
percent in 1993 (Figure 9). This negatively affected many community-based projects, given that 
smaller CDCs lacked the financial resources of nonprofit intermediaries and private developers. 
Housing for homeless people also proved too costly and was not as extensive as envisioned.41 
 The South Bronx benefitted in the Dinkins years and received an increased allotment of 
apartments. Much of this was the doing of Felice L. Michetti who was appointed commissioner 
of HPD. Michetti was a housing expert, served as first deputy commissioner of HPD in the last 
four years of the Koch administration, and had championed low income housing initiatives by 
community groups at a time that the city government was unenthusiastic toward them. Under 
Dinkins, Michetti who had grown up in the Bronx and attended Fordham University, used her 
connections with local organizations to smooth out relations with the South Bronx churches that 
had been alienated by Koch. While she did not renegotiate the contract of Site 404, she offered 
them better alternative development sites under more generous terms than Koch. Other South 
Bronx CDCs were also given more deals and added responsibilities.42 
  In 1993, Giuliani defeated Dinkins and was elected mayor. Giuliani had accused Dinkins 
of perpetuating the city’s involvement in housing ownership and vowed to seek private 
participation. His administration made the privatization of city-owned housing a priority. Indeed 
in 1994 the City of New York owned 30,358 housing units. By the end of Giuliani’s tenure as 
mayor in 2001 this number had decreased to 8,299. While too many buildings were sold hastily 
and cheaply, fewer city-owned buildings allowed the HPD to use its operational budget for other 
purposes. Giuliani also slashed the HPD capital budget initially. Continuing problems with city 
finances did not allow additional spending, though Giuliani was also not as interested in having 
the government construct housing. He did not cancel the Ten-Year Housing Plan, but he reduced 
the capital commitments of the city. At the same time, these capital budgets stabilized after the 
mid-1990s and the city continued to rehabilitate or construct some housing throughout his 
mayoralty. Adjusted to 2013 figures, HPD’s annual capital expenditures did not go below 
$318,359,800 and in the end the Giuliani administration averaged $424,122,739 annually, which 
was higher than the 1986-89 figure (Figure 9). In some ways, the Ten-Year Housing Plan went 
beyond its original duration and became permanent, though expenditures never reached the high 
levels of the Dinkins years, the rehabilitation or construction of housing became more expensive, 
some of the money was spent on the preservation of affordable housing, and Giuliani did not 
consider the physical rebuilding of neighborhoods by the government as an accomplishment.43 
 According to surveys of the U.S. Census Bureau, between 1980 and 2000 the South 
Bronx gained 17,423 units. In the 1980s, the South Bronx lost 2,575 units because the housing 
starts of the late 1980s under the Ten-Year Housing Plan did not offset the losses. In the 1990s 
the South Bronx gained 19,998 units (Figure 4). This number represents a net gain given that 
housing is always lost. According to Alex Schwartz between 1986 and 1997, the City of New 
York under the Ten-Year Housing Plan funded housing starts for new construction and gut 
rehabilitation of 22,397 units in the South Bronx. Between 1994 and 2000, the HDC funded the 
creation of 2,350 housing units. Overall, 53,706 housing units benefitted from New York City 
capital programs in the South Bronx in 1987-2001. From these 31.4 percent were vacant and the 
overwhelming majority, 83.7 percent underwent major rehabilitation. While only 16.3 percent of 
the units were newly constructed, it is always more expensive to develop new buildings and not 
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desirable to continue having thousands of vacant ones. These gains were nowhere near the 
90,394 housing units lost in the 1970s, though the city government made a calculated decision to 
rebuild at lower densities and focus on land coverage. Indeed by the late 1990s, one no longer 
encountered the vast landscapes of abandonment that used to define the South Bronx. The 
population of the South Bronx grew from 463,118 in 1980 by 19 percent to 550,945 in 2000 
(Figure 2).44 
 
Housing in the South Bronx under the New Housing Marketplace, 2002-2013 
 In 2013, in his weekly radio appearance on WOR-AM, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg 
claimed that lack of affordable housing is an indicator of a vibrant economy, because so many 
people find the city attractive and want to live there. Although Bloomberg had a valid point, 
many housing advocates characterized his arguments as insensitive, since that the city lost 
thousands of affordable housing units from 2002-2013. For many New Yorkers the cost of 
housing became a dominant campaign issue in the mayoral election of 2013, given that housing 
expenditures increased during Bloomberg’s mayoralty (Figure 10).45 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Gross rent as a percentage of household income in the South Bronx and New York 
City, 1999-2013. This figure shows the percentage of households paying more than 30 percent of 
their income on rent as well as the percentage of households paying more than 50 percent of their 
income on rent. Housing expenditures that exceed 30 percent of household income have 
historically been viewed as an indicator of a housing affordability problem. Source: U.S. Census 
Bureau survey of 2000 and the Three-Year American Community Surveys of 2007-2013. 
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 Michael Bloomberg was elected mayor in 2001 and remained in office from 2002-2013 
after winning reelection twice. Unlike his predecessors, Bloomberg was a multi-billionaire 
businessman with no political experience. In the mayoral elections Bloomberg used his own 
personal wealth and outspent his opponents by tens of millions of dollars. While New York City 
had taken a neoliberal political-economic path since the Koch administration, under Bloomberg 
this neoliberal vision reached new heights with the corporate world having more direct influence 
in government. Bloomberg filled many of the crucial positions that dealt with economic 
development, large projects, and overall policy with affluent members of the corporate world. 
These appointees favored big businesses and developers and sought to attract to the city more 
large corporations and affluent people from around the world. At the same time, city budgets 
continued to grow (Figure 5) with Bloomberg viewing the provision of quality municipal 
services as a foundation of economic growth.46 
 Wanting to remake the physical landscape of New York City and eager to deflect 
criticisms that he only favored private market-rate development, Bloomberg developed his own 
ambitious housing plan. In 2002, he announced the New Housing Marketplace Plan (NHMP), 
pledging to preserve or create 65,000 affordable housing units in five years. In 2005, he amended 
the NHMP into a ten-year plan that would preserve or create 165,000 units of housing by 2013. 
Much of the plan focused on the preservation of existing affordable housing whose subsidies 
were going to expire. Besides the construction of rental housing for low- and moderate-income 
people, this plan included a major homeownership component for moderate-, middle-, and even 
upper-middle income people. The plan used the remainder of city-owned land to build housing 
and even pursued strategies to find new land through rezoning, land banking, and public-private 
partnerships. The city administration also provided generous incentives and tax breaks to the 
private sector, so that market-rate housing could be built and even tried to harness these entities 
to include affordable housing in their developments. However, this was largely voluntary and 
most developers chose not to include such housing in their luxury condominiums. The NHMP 
was financed by the HDC and the HPD. The HDC was given permission to increase its 
borrowing limit and to borrow against its equity. Taking advantage of a growing economy, a 
robust housing market in New York, and a good fiscal management record, the HDC became the 
nation’s largest housing finance agency. Its ability to market bonds continued even during the 
Great Recession. As Marc Jahr, president of the HDC from 2008-2014, stated “during the 
downturn, when nobody was building in Manhattan, we were financing construction in the 
neighborhoods . . . Cranes that were absent from the Manhattan skyline were up in the Bronx 
because of our financing.”47 On the average, the HDC issued bonds and notes worth 
$1,336,286,126 each year (adjusted to 2013 figures) in the 2002-2013 period. Some additional 
money came from the HDC’s corporate reserves and other sources. The HPD, which worked 
closely with the HDC, spent on the average an additional $434,118,389 each year from its capital 
budget. When combined, these amounts were higher than those spent annually in the 1986-2001 
period for housing (Figure 9). However, the construction of new housing and even rehabilitation 
cost significantly more in 2002-2013 than before.48 
 Bloomberg administration officials heralded the NHMP as the largest municipal housing 
effort in the history of the nation, though the meaning of this statement remains unclear. It is 
possible that more money was spent for the NHMP than any other municipal housing program in 
the United States, but this did not translate into the largest housing production. Between 2004 
and 2013, the NHMP preserved the affordable status of 106,540 of housing units and built 
45,811 new ones. In addition, 39.1 percent of the housing built under the NHMP was for 
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homeowners. The cost of this housing for homeowners was a bargain while regulations would 
keep these prices affordable for a number of years. At the same time, despite their affordability, 
these housing units were not for low income populations and barely served people with moderate 
incomes.49 
 In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the number of occupied housing units in the 
South Bronx increased by 16,311 (Figure 4). By 2013 the NHMP had helped finance 
approximately 37,000 affordable units in the South Bronx (Figure 11). Less than half were new 
construction with the majority being existing affordable units whose status was preserved. 
Almost all of this housing comprised of rentals for low- and moderate-income people. Indeed out 
of 194,536 occupied housing units in the South Bronx, only 12,790 were owner-occupied in 
2010 slightly up from 12,162 in 2000. The population of the South Bronx increased by 7.4 
percent in the 2000s, reaching the figure of 591,661 people (Figure 2).50   
 
 
 
Figure 11. New construction in the South Bronx under the New Housing Marketplace Plan. 
Source: Photo taken by the author, 2007. 
 
 The citywide loss of affordable housing in the 2000s did not affect the South Bronx 
significantly, because the city government stepped up and preserved almost all of the units 
whose affordable status was expiring. Indeed only 8.9 percent of all rentals were under no 
regulation in 2002; by 2011 this figure had increased to 11.5 percent, which is not substantial and 
could be a transitional matter, given that the NHMP was still in the process of preserving the 
affordability of housing units. The city administration took this road in the South Bronx because 
of fears that deregulated housing could fail. There were also fears of a humanitarian crisis, given 
that more than 70,000 low income people could potentially face displacement in the case of 
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deregulation. The Great Recession further dissuaded many landlords from deregulating, given 
that cost-benefit analyses showed that accepting subsidies from the government in the South 
Bronx was a sounder decision.51 
 While the great majority of housing remained regulated in the South Bronx, the rise in 
housing costs represents a worrisome trend. Up until the early 2000s increases in the median 
household income matched and even surpassed increases in median gross rent. In the years that 
followed, incomes stagnated and declined while rents continued to increase (Figure 12). One 
could argue that this is a problem of income rather than a problem of housing costs. Still, more 
and more households in the South Bronx are burdened by higher housing expenditures. The 
percentage of households in the South Bronx spending more than 30% of their income for rent 
surpassed the 60% figure in 2012. Moreover, more than 36% of households spend more than half 
of their income for rent (Figure 10). Although these trends resemble citywide ones, the burden in 
the South Bronx is higher. Given that many of these households have no significant savings, they 
are quite vulnerable to housing loss, if something suddenly goes wrong.   
 
 
 
Figure 12. Trends of median household income in relation to median gross rents in the South 
Bronx, 1980-2013. Index: Year 1980 = 100. Source: U.S. Census Bureau surveys, 1980-2000, 
and the Three-Year American Community Survey, 2013. 
Conclusion 
 Efforts to rebuild the South Bronx, which was the city’s largest contiguous devastated 
area in postwar New York, began in 1977 and materialized after 1986. The continuity of this 
rebuilding is staggering given that four successive and very different city administrations insisted 
in transforming the South Bronx into an area with almost no abandoned housing and empty lots. 
Since 1980 the South Bronx has gained approximately 34,000 housing units, almost all of which 
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were built or rehabilitated because of initiatives by the city government combining federal, state, 
city, and private money. More than this, the affordability of thousands of units was renewed in 
the 2000s when original subsidies were expiring. This represents a rare case for our era of 
successful government action, using public-private partnerships to rebuild a vast urban area with 
housing that is affordable. 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Foreign-Born People as a percentage of the entire population. The areas surveyed are 
the South Bronx, New York City in its entirety, and Queens, the borough with the highest 
proportion of immigrants. Source: U.S. Census Bureau surveys, 1980-2000, and the Five-Year 
American Community Survey, 2013. 
 The population of the South Bronx increased from 463,118 in 1980 to 591,661 in 2010 
(Figure 2) with a great percentage of these newcomers being immigrants. In 1980, only 14.2 
percent of people living in the South Bronx were foreign-born; by 2013, this figure had more 
than doubled to 35.5 percent (Figure 13). To be sure this figure is lower than the city average, 
and smaller compared to Queens, the borough with the largest proportion of immigrants in New 
York City. However, the number of immigrants has been growing faster in the South Bronx than 
in most other places (Figure 14). In the 1970s, many immigrants moving to New York avoided 
the South Bronx, which was losing housing and was experiencing severe socioeconomic 
problems. This began to change in the 1980s and continued unabated in the decades that 
followed. Lower rental prices have made the South Bronx increasingly attractive to newcomers 
and to working class immigrants living in other boroughs. In 2010, the number of foreign-born 
people living in the South Bronx was 203,887.52   
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Figure 14. Trends in the settlement of foreign-born people in the South Bronx, New York City, 
and Queens since 1980. Index: Year 1980 = 100. Source: Graph created by the author after 
consulting Social Explorer, the U.S. Census Bureau surveys, 1980-2000, and the Five-Year 
American Community Survey, 2013. 
 Unlike other distressed urban areas in the United States, the South Bronx was able to 
reinvent itself because of a large influx of immigrants in the post-fiscal crisis era; still, if not for 
the new housing, the great majority of these people would not have moved to the South Bronx 
and in this sense the city government deserves credit for the area’s revitalization. Although so 
called empty or abandoned spaces are always occupied by people, and informal settlements 
whose residents included immigrants were formed in many parts of New York in the 1970s and 
the 1980s, it is doubtful that these spaces would have attracted the thousands of families that 
have relocated to the South Bronx. 
 As I have argued elsewhere, urban areas in the United States are becoming increasingly 
diverse, though this diversity in the South Bronx involves mostly Latinos and blacks (Figure 15). 
In 1980, Puerto Ricans and African Americans dominated the social makeup of the area. In the 
decades that followed the population diversified. In terms of Latinos, Dominicans became the 
largest group numerically in the 2000s overtaking Puerto Ricans. The number of Mexicans has 
been increasing geometrically since 1980, though the group remains a distant third. Other Latino 
groups with smaller but sizable numbers include Hondurans, Ecuadorians, Salvadorans, 
Guatemalans, Cubans, Colombians, Peruvians, Nicaraguans, and Panamanians. According to the 
2010 census, 66.1 percent of South Bronx residents were Latino. In terms of groups of African 
descent excluding Latinos, African Americans still constitute an overwhelming majority. 
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However, the numbers of people from Subsaharan Africa have been increasing with 
approximately 35,000 people living in the South Bronx by 2010. Ghanaians comprise the largest 
group of Subsaharan Africans with Nigerians being a distant second and Senegalese third. There 
are also about 18,000 West Indians, though their numbers have not grown since 1990 and 
slightly declined in the 2000s. Jamaicans are the majority of West Indians in the South Bronx 
while many other countries from the region are also represented. At the same time, the racial and 
ethnic makeup of the South Bronx shows the extent to which racial segregation is persisting in 
the United States. A contiguous urban area with approximately 600,000 people has almost no 
whites or Asians (Figure 15). And while these trends are complex and may have to do with 
housing policy, immigrant networks, and social geography, the population of the South Bronx is 
also segregated by class.53   
 
 
 
Figure 15. Racial and ethnic groups in the South Bronx, 1980-2010 in actual population numbers. 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau surveys, 1970-2010. 
 The population of the South Bronx is near the bottom of New York’s income hierarchy. 
Adjusted for inflation, the annual median household income on the South Bronx has remained 
almost stable since 1980, reaching the $25,789 figure in 2000, before declining to $24,401 in 
2013 (all of these figures in 2013 dollars). The median household income of the South Bronx is 
significantly lower from that of the Bronx in its entirety. It is also less than half of the median 
household income of the entire city (Figure 16). In terms of occupation, the percentage of 
individuals involved in service employment has been rapidly increasing since 1970, reaching the 
figure of 39.4 percent in 2013 (Figure 17). These jobs are among the lowest paying. Only 15.8 
percent of working adults had managerial or professional occupations in 2013, which were 
usually the best paying. Given the occupation indicators, it is not surprising that there are many 
more families living in poverty in the South Bronx than in the Bronx and New York City.  
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Figure 16. Median household income in 2013 inflation-adjusted dollars in New York City, the 
Bronx, and the South Bronx. Source: U.S. Census Bureau Surveys, 1980-2000, and the Five-
Year American Community Survey, 2013. 
 Despite the low incomes and high poverty rates, the South Bronx remains a stable area 
and inexpensive housing contributes significantly toward that goal. To be sure, since 2000, 
incomes have been slowly declining while rents, despite regulations and subsidies, have been 
increasing. In 2000, the median gross rent in the South Bronx was $737. By 2013, it had 
increased by 23.9 percent, reaching the figure of $937 (all figures in 2013 dollars). During the 
same period, median households incomes declined by 7 percent. The rent increases have 
occurred for various reasons. The affordable housing of the NHMP is more expensive than 
previous housing schemes. More than this, rent-stabilized units are subject to periodic rent 
increases that are expected to cover inflation and higher maintenance charges. Still, these rents 
remain inexpensive enough to allow low income people to live there, it is just that the trend at 
the moment appears to be troublesome. 
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Figure 17. Type of occupation by percentage, 1970-2013. Source: U.S. Census Bureau Surveys, 
1970-2000, and the Five-Year American Community Survey, 2013. 
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